



Aviation Accident Review



FY00

Department of the Interior Aviation Accident Review

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Office of Aircraft Services



Ground Rules



The National Transportation Safety Board

- ◆ **NTSB 831.13** Flow and dissemination of accident or incident information.

(b) ... Parties to the investigation may relay to their respective organizations information necessary for purposes of prevention or remedial action.

... However, no (release of) information... without prior consultation and approval of the NTSB.



Ground Rules



The National Transportation Safety Board

- ◆ Avoid discussion of “Probable Cause”, unless determined and published by the NTSB
- ◆ This presentation is provided for accident prevention purposes only



Ground Rules

Each accident is unique

Although the results may be very similar the causal factors leading up to an accident are seldom exactly alike.

Therefore it is unlikely that any two sets of findings, recommendations, or presentations will ever be the same.

It is imperative that you focus your attention on the underlying "root" causes for each unique accident and avoid comparing one investigation or presentation against another.



“The PROCESS”

Accident Investigation
involves asking three questions

What happened?

(gather facts)

Why did it happen?

(causal analysis)

What can we do to prevent it?

(develop recommendations)

The 3W's of accident investigation



Aviation Accident Review

Cessna 185

Loveland, CO

Mission

Pilot training

February 7, 2000

Weather

VMC

Damage

Substantial

Injuries

One minor

Procurement

Fleet

NTSB ID

DEN00TA049

During a flight review, the flight instructor, who was at the controls, failed to maintain directional control as the aircraft touched down and the aircraft spun to the right (ground loop) striking the left wing on the runway.

The pilot-in-command allowed the flight instructor to make the landing without ensuring that he was current in the aircraft and current in tail wheel aircraft.









NTSB Probable Cause ***Loveland, CO, February 7, 2000***



The National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was ...

Probable Cause

- The failure of the pilot-in-command to maintain directional control, resulting in an inadvertent ground loop.

A factor was the crosswind.





OAS Observations ***Loveland, CO, February 7, 2000***

Issue

Pilot-in-command did not know the flight instructor was not current in either tail wheel aircraft or this model of aircraft



Crew Resource Management

- Are thorough pre-mission briefings being conducted for all missions?
- Do pilots routinely check crewmembers
 - qualifications
 - skill-level
 - physical and mental state
- Does everyone feel comfortable halting unsafe operations?

Supervision

- Do you know what you're getting into when you approve a mission?



OAS Observations ***Loveland, CO, February 7, 2000***

Issue

***Pilot in left seat
received minor head
injury when his
headset hit the door***



Aviation **Life Support Equipment**

- Should DOI require the install of dual shoulder harness restraint systems ?
- Should DOI require the use of flight helmets instead of headsets ?



OAS Observations ***Loveland, CO, February 7, 2000***

Issue

***Informal flight plan
with pilot who drove
crew to airport***



Mission Planning

- Why do pilots fail to comply with OPM 00-2 requirements for:
 - flight plans (FAA, ICAO, Bureau approved, or an OAS approved vendor program)
 - flight following
- How can DOI improve compliance with OPM 00-2 ?



OAS Observations ***Loveland, CO, February 7, 2000***

Issue

Aircraft inspection overdue

Mission Planning

- Do pilots commonly overlook required inspections (i.e. 100 hour inspections)?





Aviation Accident Review

Talkeetna, AK

June 19, 2000

Cessna 185

Mission Passenger transport

Weather VMC
(to IMC w/thunderstorms)

Damage Destroyed

Injuries Four fatal


Procurement Rental

NTSB ID ANC00GA071

During a mission to transport three people to a basecamp in Denali NP the pilot encountered adverse weather. The pilot turned the aircraft around and found his retreat blocked by the weather. After an extensive search the wreckage was located.

There were no survivors.





Destination:
Denali
Basecamp

Kahiltna Ice
Falls

X
**Accident
Site**

Big Bend of
the Kahiltna

Talkeetna

**122.7
South**
Mountain Advisory
Frequency

122.9 CTAF
Chelatna Lake (Pvt)






Debris

Left wing

Main fuselage

Approx 3000'
>45° slope

Engine





NTSB Probable Cause Talkeetna, AK, June 19, 2000



The National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was ...



Probable Cause

- The pilot's continued flight into known adverse weather conditions and subsequent in-flight break-up.**

Factors in the accident were weather conditions consisting of low ceilings, turbulence, and an occluded front with convective activity, and inadequate oversight of the flight by company management.



Observations

Talkeetna, AK, June 19, 2000

Issue

Pilot encountered unanticipated adverse weather enroute to Denali Base Camp



Mission Planning

- Were available resources fully utilized ?
 - time for planning
 - FSS weather
 - PIREPSs
- Were alternate routes planned and emergency landing areas identified ?



Observations

Talkeetna, AK, June 19, 2000

Issue

Pilot encountered unanticipated adverse weather enroute to Denali Base Camp



Crew Resource Management

- Do pilots use available personnel?
 - clearing aircraft
 - reading checklists
- Do passengers know they can say NO ?

Communications

- Would more VHF / FM repeaters increase PIREPS and enhance safety in this area?



Observations

Talkeetna, AK, June 19, 2000

Issue

Contract pilots and organizations would benefit from, but generally do not participate in, DOI conducted briefings



Education

Should contract organizations and personnel be involved in aviation safety training events such as:

- mishap reviews
- hazard reporting procedures
- safety policies



Aviation Accident Review

Cessna 337

Mission

Weather

Damage

Injuries

Procurement

NTSB ID

Pax Transport

VMC

Substantial

None

Rental

LAX00TA263

Battle Mountain, NV

July 12, 2000

Aircraft landed with the gear retracted at the Battle Mountain airport.

The pilot was focused on the wind and his airspeed and failed to extend the gear.

The pilot did not use available aids to ensure the gear was extended, i.e. a checklist, other crewmembers, the warning horn or the mirrors.







Structural Damage to Frame





NTSB Probable Cause ***Battle Mountain, NV, July 12, 2000***



The National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was ...



Probable Cause

- The failure of the pilot to extend the landing gear, and his failure to follow the published before landing checklist concerning extension of the landing gear.**



OAS Observations

Battle Mountain, NV, July 12, 2000

Issue

Pilot-in-command did not use a checklist and forgot to lower the landing gear



Procedures

- How do we ensure pilots properly prioritize actions and maintain situational awareness ?
- Would use of a checklist have prevented this accident ?
- What should DOI do for failure to use a checklist ?
- How can DOI ensure pilots conduct thorough pre-mission briefings ?



OAS Observations

Battle Mountain, NV, July 12, 2000

Issue

Pilot-in-command did not use a checklist and forgot to lower the landing gear



Crew Resource Management

- Should DOI require all aircrewmembers to be trained on CRM
- Why do pilots fail to use available personnel to...
 - read checklists
 - ensure landing gear is extended



Aviation Accident Review

Bell 206L-1/C30P

Mission Pax Transport

Weather VMC

Damage Destroyed

Injuries One fatal

One serious

One minor

Procurement Exclusive use

NTSB ID LAX00GA286

Montello, NV

August 3, 2000

While on a mission to transport two firefighters, the helicopter was at a 2'-3' hover when it suddenly and violently rolled to the right. The main rotor separated and the aircraft came to rest on its skids. The passenger in the front left seat was seriously injured and the passenger in the left rear seat was fatally injured.





N10864






Aviation Life Support Equipment



Left Front Passenger

**2nd
Main Rotor
Blade Strike**

**Main Rotor
Blade Strike**



Left Front Passenger



**Analysis by the
U.S. Army Aeromedical
Research Lab**

Left Front Passenger




*This helmet
SAVED
a life !!!*



Both Front Passengers

Seatbelts held

Shoulder harnesses didn't



Left Rear Passenger

Seatbelt held



But a shoulder harness was not required and not installed





NTSB Probable Cause Montello, NV, August 3, 2000



The National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was ...

Probable Cause

- The loss of control in hovering flight and impact with terrain for undetermined reasons.**





OAS Observations ***Montello, NV, August 3, 2000***

Issue

Use of flight helmets saved one life



Aviation Life Support Equipment

- How should DOI encourage maximum use of available ALSE (i.e helmets) ?
- Should DOI require the installation of dual shoulder harness restraint systems ?



Aviation Accident Review

Bell 412

Mission

Weather

Damage

Injuries

Procurement

NTSB ID

Fire Suppression

VMC

Destroyed

One fatal

CWN

LAX00GA297

Cold Springs, NV

August 13, 2000

**NTSB Investigation On-Going
Preliminary Information**

On a fire suppression mission a Bell 412 using a Bambi Bucket crashed on a rocky hillside. The single occupant, the pilot, was fatally injured.





Aviation Accident Review



On August 13, 2000, at 1646 hours Pacific daylight time, a Bell 412, N174EH, was destroyed when it collided with mountainous terrain while conducting a water drop on a wildfire along a ridgeline near Cold Springs, Nevada.


The helicopter was operated by the Bureau of Land Management as a public-use firefighting mission under the provisions of FAR Part 91

The airline transport pilot sustained fatal injuries.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the accident flight.




Aviation Accident Review



The investigation has revealed that the crash sequence began with a catastrophic failure in the #1 engine's compressor turbine (CT) section.

Detailed metallurgical analysis indicates the fracture of the #1 CT disc occurred as a result of cyclic stress rupture (*a phenomenon where at high temperature a material's strain resistance is compromised*).



"In summary, the CT disc failed due to stress rupture brought about by sustained operation near or above acceptable limits. No material or design deficiencies were identified." (Sidla, TSB)




N174EH




Accident site

Flight path



Fuselage

Water Trail



Initial Impact of Fuselage

Initial Impact of Bucket



Debris Field

Main Rotor Blade



Main Rotor Blade

Tail Rotor




Indications of low rotor RPM at impact



Knot was added

**Additional
ring inside
80% ring**



Oversight by Helicopter Managers

AIRCRAFT CONTRACT DAILY DIARY

PAGE 1 OF 1
DATE: 7-26-06

F5 55924092039
45 140699801970

WALK FIRE J 946 NEVADA

1. CONTRACTOR N174EN Bell 412	2. CONTRACT NO. / ITEM NO.	3. HOME BASE	4. CURRENT LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT WALK FIRE J 946 NEVADA
4. AIRCRAFT NO. AND MAKE/MODEL	5. GOVT. REPRESENTATIVE ON SITE	6. CONTRACTOR REP. ON SITE	
7. PILOT(S) ON DUTY CLEAR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR <input type="checkbox"/> RELIEF	8. MECHANIC(S) ON DUTY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REGULAR <input type="checkbox"/> RELIEF	9. DRIVER ON DUTY <input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELIEF
10. WEATHER	11. FUEL PRICE	12. OTHER AIRCRAFT ON BASE	
13. STANDBY/AVAILABILITY:	BEGIN: _____	END: _____	TOTAL: _____
14. EXTENDED AVAILABILITY:	BEGIN: _____	END: _____	TOTAL: _____
15. SERVICE TRUCK MILEAGE	BEGIN: _____	END: _____	TOTAL: _____
16. WORK ORDER ISSUED (Include Suspend/Resume)	17. INCIDENT/HAZARD REPORT(S) ISSUED? <input type="checkbox"/> YES (Attach Copy) <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
18. LIST MATERIALS FURNISHED TO JOB SITE (Furnished By: G - Govt; C - Contractor; S - Subcontractor)	19. LIST EQUIPMENT ON SITE (Furnished By: G - Govt; C - Contractor; S - Subcontractor)		
Item	Hours Used	Furnished By	Item



AIR CRAFT WORKED WELL, PILOT IS VERY
GOOD. OLD NAM VGT. MEDICAL PILOT. SHUTTLED
CREWS IN AM. BUCKET WORK PERFORMED IN THE
AFTERNOON. WENT OVER AGAIN THAT WE AS AN AGENCY
DON'T WANT THEM OVER TOURQUING (SP) THE SHIP BECAUSE HG HAS
THE B.G. OF A BUCKET.

CWN Helicopter Contract Load Calculation Requirements

1999 - 2000 - 2001



INTERAGENCY
CALL-WHEN-NEEDED
HELICOPTERS



PROJECT: CALL-WHEN-NEEDED MEDIUM AND HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTER SERVICES

LOCATION: NATION-WIDE

CONTRACTOR: VARIOUS

AWARDING OFFICE: USDA FOREST SERVICE AND OFFICE OF AIRCRAFT SERVICES NIFC

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR HELICOPTER LOAD CALCULATION

HELICOPTER
MODEL _____
NO. _____

Pilot	Project	Date
		Time
1. Departure Base		Pressure ALT Temperature
2. Destination Base		Pressure ALT Temperature
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight		
4. Flight Crew Weight		
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)		
6. Operating Weight		
		IGE OGE
7. Computed Gross Weight		
8. Fixed Weight Reduction		
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)		
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)		
11. Selected Weight (Lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)		
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)		
13. Allowable Payload		
14. Passengers and/or Cargo		
Names		
Weight		
15. Actual Payload		
16. Actual Gross Weight (12 Plus 15) (Must Not Exceed Line 11)		

Pilot

Foreman

CWN Helicopter Contract Load Calculation Requirements

J.11 STANDARD INTERAGENCY LOAD CALCULATION INSTRUCTIONS

(1) PURPOSE. The purpose is to ensure that the aircraft is capable of carrying a specified identified elevation at a given density altitude.

Pilot is required to complete Blocks 1-13
HEMG is responsible to check the pilot

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR HELICOPTER LOAD CALCULATION		HELICOPTER MODEL _____ NO. _____	
Pilot _____	Project _____	Date _____	
		Time _____	
1. Departure Base		Pressure ALT Temperature	
2. Destination Base		Pressure ALT Temperature	
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight			
4. Flight Crew Weight			
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)			
6. Operating Weight		IGE	OGE
7. Computed Gross Weight			
8. Fixed Weight Reduction			
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)			
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)			
11. Selected Weight (lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)			
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)			

The Pilot must utilize the applicable charts in the aircraft flight manual, referencing them each time a load calculation is initiated. The Helicopter Manager is responsible for ensuring that the Pilot does this.

For USDI agencies, the Pilot is required to complete Blocks 1-13. For USDA-FS, the Pilot is required to complete Blocks 1-11.

The Pilot must utilize the applicable charts in the aircraft flight manual, referencing them each time a load calculation is initiated. The Helicopter Manager is responsible for ensuring that the Pilot does this.

The Pilot signs after the Helicopter Manager has completed the remainder of the form.

Load Calculation - Allowable Payload

Pilot	Project	NO. <u>11424</u>	Date <u>8-12-00</u>	Time <u>1:30</u>	Pressure ALT	Temperature
1. Departure Base					5500	
2. Destination Base						
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight					7380	
4. Flight Crew Weight					220	
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)					1000	
6. Operating Weight					8600	
					IGE	OGE
7. Computed Gross Weight					11700	10300
8. Fixed Weight Reduction					390	JET
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)					11310	10300
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)					11700	
11. Selected Weight (Lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)					11310	10300
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)					8600	8600
13. Allowable Payload					2710	1700
14. Passengers and/or Cargo						

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR HELICOPTER LOAD CALCULATION						MODEL <u>414</u>
Pilot	Project	NO. <u>12407</u>	Date <u>8-17-00</u>	Time	Pressure ALT	Temperature
1. Departure Base					5500	
2. Destination Base						+30
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight					7380	
4. Flight Crew Weight					220	
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)					1000	
6. Operating Weight					8600	
					IGE	OGE
7. Computed Gross Weight					11700	11000
8. Fixed Weight Reduction					390	JET
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)					11310	11000
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)					11700	
11. Selected Weight (Lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)					11310	11000
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)					8600	8600
13. Allowable Payload					2710	2400
14. Passengers and/or Cargo						

Allowable Payload
 The maximum allowable weight (passengers and/or cargo) that can be carried for the mission


15. Actual Payload
 16. Actual Gross Weight (12 Plus Must Not Exceed Limit)
 Pilot
 OAS-67 (02/81)

Aircraft Performance Planning

BHT-412-FMS-35.2

Bell Model 412

BHT-412-FM-1



ROTORCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL

S/N 33001 — 33107

TYPE CERTIFICATION	H4SW
REGISTRATION NO.	
APPROVED BY	<i>Don P. Watton</i>
	MANAGER
	ROTORCRAFT CERTIFICATION OFFICE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FT. WORTH, TEXAS 76193-0170
DATE	JANUARY 9, 1981

THIS MANUAL SHALL BE IN THE HELICOPTER DURING ALL OPERATIONS

Bell Helicopter **TEXTRON**
A Subsidiary of Textron Inc.

POST OFFICE BOX 482 • FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76101

9 JANUARY 1981

REVISION 18 — 26 MARCH 1998

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Bell **412**
MODEL

ROTORCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL

SUPPLEMENT CATEGORY B OPERATIONS WHEN CONFIGURED WITH NINE OR LESS PASSENGER SEATS

33108 — 33213
34001 — 34024
36001 — 36019

AND
33001 — 33107
WHEN 412-075-008-111
TORQUEMETER IS INSTALLED
(BHT-412-FMS-18.1)

CERTIFIED
10 APRIL 1991

This supplement shall be attached to Model 412 Flight Manual when helicopter is configured with nine or less passengers seat configuration.

Information contained herein supplements information of basic Flight Manual. For Limitations, Procedures, and Performance Data not contained in this supplement, or other applicable supplements, consult basic Flight Manual.

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
POST OFFICE BOX 482 • FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76101

10 MAY 1996
REVISION 1 — 23 APRIL 1998

Aircraft Performance Planning In Ground Effect

HOVER CEILING IN GROUND EFFECT

POWER: SEE NOTE BELOW
ENGINE RPM 100%
GENERATOR 150 AMPS (EA.)



Conservative
figures for
Helibase


Figure 4-4. Hover ceiling in ground effect (Sheet 1 of 2)

**HOVER CEILING
OUT OF GROUND EFFECT**

TAKEOFF POWER
ENGINE RPM 100%
GENERATOR 150 AMPS (EA.)

CAUTION: OGE HOVER OPERATION MAY RESULT IN VIOLATIO

**Aircraft
Performance
Planning
Out of Ground
Effect**



**Conservative
figures for
Helibase**

**Performance
Calculations for
Accident Site**

Figure 4-5. Hover ceiling out of ground effect (Sheet 1 of 8)

Load Calculation - Allowable Payload

Pilot		Project		NO. <u>11457</u>
1. Departure Base		Date	<u>8-12-00</u>	
2. Destination Base		Time	<u>+30</u>	
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight		Pressure ALT	<u>5500</u>	
4. Flight Crew Weight		Temperature	<u>5500</u>	
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)			<u>1000</u>	
6. Operating Weight			<u>8600</u>	
		IGE	OGE	
7. Computed Gross Weight		<u>11700</u>	<u>10300</u>	
8. Fixed Weight Reduction		<u>390</u>	<u>J&T</u>	
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)		<u>11310</u>	<u>10300</u>	
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)		<u>11700</u>		
11. Selected Weight (Lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)		<u>11310</u>	<u>10300</u>	
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)		<u>8600</u>	<u>8600</u>	
13. Allowable Payload		<u>2710</u>	<u>1700</u>	
14. Passengers and/or Cargo				

MODEL <u>412</u>		NO. <u>17957</u>	
Date		<u>8-12-00</u>	
Time		<u>+30</u>	
Pressure ALT		<u>5500</u>	
Temperature		<u>+30</u>	
7380			
220			
1000			
8600			
IGE		OGE	
<u>11700</u>		<u>11000</u>	
<u>390</u>		<u>J&T</u>	
<u>11310</u>		<u>11000</u>	
<u>11700</u>			
<u>11310</u>		<u>11000</u>	
<u>8600</u>		<u>8600</u>	
<u>2710</u>		<u>2400</u>	

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR HELICOPTER LOAD CALCULATION			HELICOPTER MODEL <u>Bell 412</u>
Pilot			NO. _____
Project			Date
Time			Pressure ALT
Temperature			Temperature
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight			<u>7380</u>
4. Flight Crew Weight			<u>300 (287+gear)</u>
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)			<u>1000</u>
6. Operating Weight			<u>8680</u>
			IGE
7. Computed Gross Weight			<u>10,300</u>
8. Fixed Weight Reduction			<u>JET</u>
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)			<u>9,910</u>
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)			<u>11,900 (pg 1-1)</u>
11. Selected Weight (Lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)			<u>9,910</u>
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)			<u>8680</u>
13. Allowable Payload			<u>1230</u>

5500'/26°C

5500'/26°C

Allowable Payload

The maximum allowable weight (passengers and/or cargo) that can be carried for the mission

Hover in ground effect (HIGE)	1230 lbs
Hover out of ground effect (HOGE)	1620 lbs

Names Weight

15. Actual Payload

16. Actual Gross Weight (Must Not Exceed Limit)

Pilot

AS 67 (02/81)

HOVER CEILING OUT OF GROUND EFFECT


TAKEOFF POWER
ENGINE RPM 100%
GENERATOR 150 AMPS (EA.)

SKID HEIGHT 60 FEET
HEATER ON OR OFF
0°C TO 52°C

NOTE: THESE DATA VALID FOR ZERO WIND OUTSIDE OF THE CRITICAL WIND AZIMUTH AREA (REFER TO FIGURE 4-5)

Conservative figures for Helibase

**Aircraft Performance Planning
Out of Ground Effect**



412 ROTORCRAFT
FLIGHT MANUAL
33001 THROUGH 33107

Pilot's Flawed Aircraft Performance Planning

HOVER CEILING
IN GROUND EFFECT

SEE NOTE BELOW
M 100%
R 150 AMPS (EA.)

MODEL	412
NO.	174571
Date	8-13-00
Time	
Pressure ALT	5300
Temperature	+30
Pressure ALT	
Temperature	
	7380
	220
	1000
	8600
IGE	OGE
11700	11000
39	JBT
11310	11000
11,700	
11310	11000
8600	8600
2710	2400





Figure 4-4. Hover ceiling in ground effect (Sheet 1 of 2)

Bambi Bucket Loading



Model	Capacity			Gross Weight		Empty Weight	
	Imp. Gal	US Gal	Litres	Lbs	Kg	Lbs	Kg
6072	60	72	270	666	303	66	30
8096	80	96	365	870	395	70	32
9011	90	108	410	971	441	70	32
1012	100	120	455	1072	487	72	33
1214	120	144	545	1273	579	73	33
1518	150	180	680	1574	797	75	34
1821	175	210	795	1876	853	76	35
2024	200	240	910	2135	970	135	61
2732	270	324	1225	2853	1300	154	70
3542	336	420	1590	3667	1667	167	76
4453	440	530	2000	4587	2085	170	85

Model 3542

100%	420 gal	3667 lbs
90%	378 gal	3282 lbs
80%	336 gal	2934 lbs
70%	294 gal	2585 lbs

Load Calculation

Pilot	Project	NO. <u>11457H</u>
	Date	<u>8-12-00</u>
	Time	<u>+30</u>
1. Departure Base	Pressure ALT	<u>5500</u>
2. Destination Base	Temperature	
3. Helicopter Equipped Weight		<u>7380</u>
4. Flight Crew Weight		<u>220</u>
5. Fuel (Gals. X lbs.)		<u>1000</u>
6. Operating Weight		<u>8600</u>
	IGE	OGE
7. Computed Gross Weight	<u>11700</u>	<u>10300</u>
8. Fixed Weight Reduction	<u>390</u>	<u>JET</u>
9. Adjusted Weight (7 Minus 8)	<u>11310</u>	<u>10300</u>
10. Takeoff/Landing Limits (Handbook Limitation Section)	<u>11700</u>	
11. Selected Weight (Lowest of 9 or 10 for Nonjettisonable)	<u>11310</u>	<u>10300</u>
12. Operating Weight (Line 6)	<u>8600</u>	<u>8600</u>
13. Allowable Payload	<u>2710</u>	<u>1700</u>
14. Passengers and/or Cargo		

MODEL <u>412</u>	
NO. <u>17907H</u>	
Date <u>8-12-00</u>	
Time <u>+30</u>	
Pressure ALT <u>5500</u>	
Temperature <u>+30</u>	
7380	
220	
1000	
8600	
IGE	OGE
11700	11000
390	JET
11310	11000
11,700	
11310	11000
8600	8600
2710	2400

HELICOPTER MODEL Bell 412	
NO. _____	
Date _____	
Time _____	
Pressure ALT Temperature 5500/26°C	
Pressure ALT Temperature _____	
7380	
300 (287+gear)	
1000	
8680	
IGE	OGE
11,500	10,300
390	JET
11,110	10,300
11,900 (pg 1-1)	
11,110	10,300
8,680	8,680
2,430	1,620

HELICOPTER MODEL Bell 412	
NO. _____	
Date _____	
Time _____	
Pressure ALT Temperature 6430/28°C	
Pressure ALT Temperature _____	
7380	
300 (287+gear)	
1000	
8680	
IGE	OGE
11,100	9,800
390	JET
10,710	9,800
11,900 (pg 1-1)	
10,710	9,800
8,680	8,680
2,030	1,120

	Model 3542	
100%	420 gal	3667 lbs
90%	378 gal	3282 lbs
80%	336 gal	2934 lbs
70%	294 gal	2585 lbs

3542

Why?

How big of a bucket could have been carried

16. SPECIFICATIONS

16.2 Suggested Buckets for Different Helicopters

Note: These are guidelines only.

The helicopter operator must make the decision as to which model Bambi Bucket is appropriate.

Bambi Model	Gross Wt (lbs/Kg)	Suggested Helicopters
6072	666/303	Robinson R-44
8096	870/395	Bell 47 & 206A, Enstrom F28F, F280FX, Rogerson UH-1H, UH-1H, UH-1H

Suggested Buckets for Different Helicopters

The following is a recommended sizing chart of Bambi Bucket for various helicopters. It should be stressed that this is only a guideline, and the decision is ultimately up to the helicopter operator.



2727	2732/1240	Aerospatiale Gazpache 2, MDH BK 117, EC 135,
2732	2853/1300	Bell 204, Sikorsky S-76A, S-76B, MD Explorer
3542	3667/1667	Augusta AB 212 & AB 412, Bell 204B, 205, 212 & 412 SP, Huey UH-1H
4453	4487/2085	Aerospatiale Puma, California/Sikorsky S58T, W3 Sokol
5566	5725/2602	Aerospatiale Puma, Bell 214B & 214 St., Kawasaki-Boeing KV107, Sikorsky UH 60-A (Black Hawk), MI-8, MI-17

How big of a bucket could have been carried

Model	Capacity			Gross Weight		Empty Weight	
	Imp. Gal	US Gal	Litres	Lbs	Kg	Lbs	Kg
6072	60	72	270	666	303	66	30
8096	80	96	365	870	395	70	32
9011	90	108	410	971	441	70	32
1012	100	120	455	1072	487	72	33
1214	120	144	545	1273	579	73	33
1518	150	180	680	1574	797	75	34
1821	175	210	795	1876	853	76	35
2024	200	240	910	2135	970	135	61
2732	270	324	1225	2853	1300	154	70
3542	350	420	1590	3667	1667	167	76
4453	440	530	2000	4587	2085	170	85
5566HD	550	660	2500	5805	2638	304	138
5870HD	585	700	2655	6170	2805	330	150
6578HD	650	780	2955	6846	3111	356	162
7590	750	900	3405	7775	3534	375	170
HL5000	1100	1320	5000	11390	5177	390	177
HL7600	1667	2000	7570	17115	7780	465	211
HL9800	2167	2600	9840	22180	10081	530	241

Hover out of ground effect
at 26° and 5500ft
1620 lbs

Model 3542

100% 420 gal 3667 lbs
 90% 378 gal 3304 lbs
 80% 336 gal 2956 lbs
 70% 294 gal 2607 lbs

Too heavy in all configurations

How big of a bucket could have been carried

Model	Capacity			Gross Weight		Empty Weight	
	Imp. Gal	US Gal	Litres	Lbs	Kg	Lbs	Kg
6072	60	72	270	666	303	66	30
8096	80	96	365	870	395	70	32
9011	90	108	410	971	441	70	32
1012	100	120	455	1072	487	72	33
1214	120	144	545	1273	579	73	33
1518	150	180	680	1574	797	75	34
1821	175	210	795	1876	853	76	35
2024	200	240	910	2135	970	135	61
2732	270	324	1225	2853	1300	154	70
3542	350	420	1590	3667	1667	167	76
4453	440	530	2000	4587	2085	170	85
5566HD	550	660	2500	5805	2638	304	138
5870HD	585	700	2655	6170	2805	330	150
6578HD	650	780	2955	6846	3111	356	162
7590	750	900	3405	7775	3534	375	170
HL5000	1100	1320	5000	11390	5177	390	177
HL7600	1667	2000	7570	17115	7780	465	211
HL9800	2167	2600	9840	22180	10081	530	241

Hover out of ground effect
at 26° and 5500ft
1620 lbs

Model 2732

100% 324 gal 2853 lbs
90% 292 gal 2578 lbs
80% 259 gal 2304 lbs
70% 227 gal 2038 lbs

Too heavy in all configurations

How big of a bucket could have been carried

Model	Capacity			Gross Weight		Empty Weight	
	Imp. Gal	US Gal	Litres	Lbs	Kg	Lbs	Kg
6072	60	72	270	666	303	66	30
8096	80	96	365	870	395	70	32
9011	90	108	410	971	441	70	32
1012	100	120	455	1072	487	72	33
1214	120	144	545	1273	579	73	33
1518	150	180	680	1574	797	75	34
1821	175	210	795	1876	853	76	35
2024	200	240	910	2135	970	135	61
2732	270	324	1225	2853	1300	154	70
3542	350	420	1590	3667	1667	167	76
4453	440	530	2000	4587	2085	170	85
5566HD	550	660	2500	5805	2638	304	138
5870HD	585	700	2655	6170	2805	330	150
6578HD	650	780	2955	6846	3111	356	162
7590	750	900	3405	7775	3534	375	170
HL5000	1100	1320	5000	11390	5177	390	177
HL7600	1667	2000	7570	17115	7780	465	211
HL9800	2167	2600	9840	22180	10081	530	241

Hover out of ground effect
at 26° and 5500ft
1620 lbs

Model 2024

100% 240 gal 2135 lbs

90% 216 gal 1928 lbs

80% 192 gal 1729 lbs

70% 168 gal 1529 lbs

Must be cinched to 70%

Pilot Authority and Responsibility

1999 - 2000 - 2001



INTERAGENCY

CALL-WHEN-NEEDED

HELICOPTERS



(A) The Pilot-in-Command is responsible for operating the aircraft within its operating limits, responsible for the safety of the aircraft, its occupants, and cargo...

(2) PILOT AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

(A) The Pilot-in-Command is responsible for operating the aircraft within its operating limits, responsible for safety of the aircraft, its occupants, and cargo and shall comply with the directions of the Government, except when in his/her judgment, such compliance will be a violation of applicable Federal or State regulations or contracting provisions. The Pilot shall refuse any operation considered hazardous or unsafe.

(B) The Pilot shall not permit any person to ride in the aircraft or any cargo to be loaded therein unless authorized by the Contracting Officer.

(C) Weight and Balance Control:

(1) Standard Use Helicopter Pilots are responsible for weight and balance control. The Standard Interagency Load Calculation shall be used for this purpose when passengers and/or cargo are/is being transported. Load calculation shall be computed on Form USDA-FS 5700-17 or Form OAS-67. (See Section J, LIST OF ATTACHMENTS).

HEMG Authority and Responsibility

1999 - 2000 - 2001



INTERAGENCY

CALL-WHEN-NEEDED

HELICOPTERS




(4) Suspend operations pending the removal or reinstatement of unsatisfactory equipment or personnel by the Contracting Officer

OFFICE OF AIRCRAFT SERVICES
NIFC

G.19 HELICOPTER MANAGER AUTHORITIES


A Manager will be assigned to each Helicopter furnished. In addition to directing the work of the Helicopter, the Manager has the following contract administration duties and authority:

- (1) Order aircraft services as provided in the contract.
- (2) Secure compliance with all contract provisions and specifications, and issue Work Orders/Notices of Non-Compliance as needed.
- (3) Conduct investigations and prepare Statements of Findings when requested by the Contracting Officer.
- (4) Suspend operations pending the removal or reinstatement of unsatisfactory equipment or personnel by the Contracting Officer.
- (5) Approve temporary Helicopter and Pilot substitutions.
- (6) Initiate and sign correspondence and other contract administration documents over the title "Helicopter Manager."
- (7) Maintain daily diary of contract activities.



#1 Engine Compressor Turbine


**Sprag
Clutch
Damage**



#2 Engine Sprag Clutch

**Sprag
Clutch
Slippage
(Brinelling)**

**Sprag
Clutch
Grab
Marks**



#2 Helical Gear Coupling Shaft

**Intermediate
Coupling Drive
Shaft assembly**




**Transverse
fracture due
to torsional
overload**

Materials Investigation Laboratory Report

"Fracture of two firtrees of the P.S. no.1 CT disc occurred as a result of cyclic stress rupture."

NOTE: Stress Rupture or Cyclic Stress Rupture refers to a phenomenon of high temperatures where a material's strain resistance is compromised."

"Cracking associated with necking was observed in about a dozen firtrees on the upstream face."




Materials Investigation Laboratory Report

"No microstructure changes were observed in the CT disc firtree."

"Results of dimensional measurements detected growth all around and deformation in the area of the fractures and diametrically opposite, corresponding with the cracking / stretching of the firtrees."

"The CT blades of above disc had fractured by tensile overload promoted by overheating."



Materials Investigation Laboratory Report

"Damage of the clutch drive shaft and the sprag clutch assembly was due to adhesive wear characteristic of sudden seizure."

"Transverse fracture of the coupling shaft, which engages inside the clutch shaft, was due to torsional overload and was secondary."





OAS Observations

Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000

Issue

Pilot repeatedly took excessive and unnecessary risk

Helicopter managers failed to identify and correct a hazardous aviation situation



Helicopter Managers

- Why were risks either not identified or not controlled ?
- When aviation safety problems can not be controlled are managers taught to elevate them to the appropriate level ?
- How can DOI ensure that risks are effectively managed ?
- Are managers held accountable for their decisions ?



OAS Observations

Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000

Issue

Pilot repeatedly took excessive and unnecessary risk

Helicopter managers failed to identify and correct a hazardous aviation situation



Helicopter Managers

- How can DOI ensure managers and operators understand and enforce
 - aviation policies
 - hazard reporting procedures
 - load calculations
 - other aircraft limitations



OAS Observations

Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000

Issue

Pilot repeatedly took excessive and unnecessary risk

Helicopter managers failed to identify and correct a hazardous aviation situation



Helicopter Managers

- How do we ensure managers properly prioritize actions and maintain situational awareness ?
- Should aviation managers be required to periodically observe all aspects of operations under their control (where feasible) ?
- Would use of a checklist have prevented this accident ?



OAS Observations

Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000

Issue

OAS and Bureau staff do not regularly provide training for contract pilots and personnel



Education

- How should DOI involve contract organizations and personnel in aviation safety training events ?
 - mishap reviews
 - hazard reporting procedures
 - safety policies



OAS Observations

Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000

Issue

The aircraft being utilized may not have been the best tool for the job.



Dispatching Officials

- Do dispatching officials and managers have a functional understanding of aircraft capabilities and limitations ?
 - how can DOI improve this understanding ?
- Should dispatching officials and managers be held accountable for their decisions ?



OAS Observations ***Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000***

Issue

The DOI SAFECOM system failed to identify the hazards prior to the accident



OAS Safety

- Should OAS and Bureau staff re-evaluate the DOI SAFECOM system ?
 - training
 - internal processes
 - tracking
 - follow-up
 - emphasis on human factors
 - timeliness of report submission



OAS Observations

Cold Springs, NV, August 13, 2000

Issue

The DOI SAFECOM system failed to identify the hazards prior to the accident



Helicopter Managers

- How can DOI ensure that all personnel involved in a mission understand the importance of reporting hazards ?
 - refuelers and mechanics
 - military augmentees
- How can managers break down reporting barriers ?



CHANGES

DOI Aircraft Rental Agreement Contracts

Issue

Clarification of DOI ARA Contract language concerning bucket operations and aircraft performance



B8.2.2.1 Water bucket use

- B8.2.2.1 Water Bucket Use. Use of a water bucket at a quantity less than the manufacturer's minimum adjustment level (partial dip) is not authorized. Bucket must be of a size to match the performance capability of the aircraft at the environmental operating conditions during use.



CHANGES

DOI Exclusive Use Contracts

Issue

Clarification of DOI Exclusive-Use Contract language concerning bucket operations and aircraft performance



B2.3.11 Water bucket use

- Use of a water bucket at a quantity less than the manufacturer's adjustment level **(partial dip) is not authorized.**
- Environmental operating conditions may dictate the need for more than one size bucket.



CHANGES

DOI Exclusive Use Contracts

Issue

Clarification of DOI Exclusive-Use Contract language concerning bucket operations and aircraft performance

B4.2.26 (refers to aircraft performance)

- Two (2) foldable; electrically operated; cinch-type capacity, adjustable water/retardant buckets shall be furnished under this contract.





CHANGES

DOI Exclusive Use Contracts

Issue

Clarification of DOI Exclusive-Use Contract language concerning bucket operations and aircraft performance



B4.2.26 (refers to aircraft performance)

- The **FIRST** bucket shall be commensurate with the maximum lifting capability of the aircraft using the environmental conditions as specified in section A for aircraft performance.
- The **SECOND** bucket shall be commensurate with the maximum lifting capability of the aircraft using the environmental conditions of 6,000 feet pressure altitude and 25°C.



Aviation Accident Review




Observations

- Helmets*
- Checklists*
- Flight Plans*
- Accountability*
- Flight Following*
- Restraint Systems*
- Situational Awareness*
- Reduce Risk Tolerance*
- Improve Hazard Reporting*
- Crew Resource Management*
- Use the Right Tool for the Job*
- BE ASSERTIVE !!!***

Frank E. Bird Jr.

ACCIDENT RATIO STUDY



**PRACTICAL
LOSS CONTROL
LEADERSHIP**

*The Conservation of People,
Property, Process, and Profits.*

Frank E. Bird, Jr.
and
George L. Germain



Hazard Reporting

If you think it's wrong question it



If you know it's wrong... **STOP IT !!!**



Hazard Reporting

Safety Communiqué - SAFECOM

You can drop us a line



www.aviation.fs.fed.us

www.oas.gov

Or give us a call



1.888.4MISHAP



Hazard Reporting

For hazards or heroes
Anyone can submit
Anonymous

Five Steps To A Safe Flight

1. Pilot/Aircraft Data Card - Approved & Current
2. Flight Plan/Flight Following Initiated
3. PPE in Use When Required
4. Pilot Briefed on Mission & Flight Hazards
5. Crew & Passenger Briefing to Include:
 - Aircraft Hazards
 - Fire Extinguisher
 - Seat Belt & Harness
 - Fuel & Electrical Shut-off
 - ELT & Survival Kit
 - Oxygen Equipment
 - First Aid Kit
 - Emergency Egress
 - Gear & Cargo Security
 - Smoking(Not Under Seats)

FS 8700-14 (045-103) Jan 96

Remember!

To report an aircraft accident call:

1-888-4MISHAP (1-888-464-7427)

File a SAFECOM to report any condition, observance, act, maintenance problem, or circumstance which has potential to cause an aviation-related accident.

Anyone can refuse or curtail a flight when an unsafe condition may exist.

Never let undue pressure (expressed or implied) influence your judgement or decisions. Avoid mistakes, don't hurry!

Remember...

If you see something... say something !!!



Aviation Accident Review

